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Abstract 
The accident in Fukushima, Japan, in March 2011 has reactivated the 
discussion on how to meet ambitious climate mitigation objectives as some 
European countries reconsider the contribution of nuclear power in their 
energy mix. This study evaluates the impact of nuclear power reduction in 
Europe on the electricity mix under carbon emission reduction scenarios 
while considering the availability of carbon capture and storage technological 
options. The potential cost of carbon reduction is also addressed using the 
bottom-up optimization model TIAM-FR. The results suggest that CCS 
technologies constitute an interesting option in a case of stringent climate 
targets and limited nuclear electricity. However, the unavailability of CCS 
technologies induces a significant increase in carbon cost to achieve the 
climate policy.  
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Introduction 
In March 2011, the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident in Japan sparked international 
debate on the future of nuclear energy and offered an opportunity to organize energy 
supply in a more sustainable manner (Netzer and Steinhilber, 2011). In European 
countries, it has led to contrasting energy policy responses. Several countries have made 
the decision to abandon the production of nuclear energy, while others have re-affirmed 
their intention to maintain or increase their nuclear capacity. Of the 15 European 
countries that presently possess nuclear power1, Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium 
have been faced with strong public reaction leading them to reconsider the role of 
nuclear power in their energy mix. Germany has shut down eight nuclear power plants 
and the remaining nine operating plants will be phased out by 2022. The Swiss 
government has announced its intention to close its five nuclear plants from 2019 to 
2034. In July 2012, the Belgian government confirmed the scheduled phase-out of two 
of the country’s seven reactors. In contrast, other countries continue to support nuclear 
power production. France has decided to perform European Union stress tests on its 
plants. The United Kingdom, Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania affirmed their 
commitment to nuclear power by announcing plans to build new reactors (World Energy 
Council, 2011). The long-term implications of the Fukushima incident on the use of 
nuclear power remain uncertain. It may have the effect of slowing down growth, but it 
does not seem to reverse it. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
nuclear energy will still represent a significant share in the world’s energy mix at around 
2030, with an annual growth potential in the range of 2.2%. This evolution has been 
slightly reduced, but remains significant (IAEA, 2011). At European Union (EU) level, 
the Fukushima accident has led to a slight modification in nuclear policy assumptions in 
the European Commission’s energy roadmap. While the pre-Fukushima reference 
scenario assumed a nuclear share of 26.4% in power generation by 2050, the post-
Fukushima scenario now expects a constant share of 20.5% in 2030 and 2050 (Vasakova, 
2011; Blohm-Hieber, 2012). These assumptions will have an impact on the structure of 
the electricity mix as the incident leads countries to make structural technological choices 
in the very long term. Moreover, climate change mitigation policies will also deeply 
influence the evolution of the future European electricity mix.  
                                                            
1 France , Germany, United Kingdom, Sweden, Spain, Belgium, Czech Republic, Switzerland, Finland, Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Slovenia, Netherlands. 
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The European Union has set ambitious targets in terms of greenhouse gas emissions 
(GHG) reduction. The objective is to reduce GHG emissions by 20% by 2020 and 80%-
95% by 2050 compared to 1990 levels. In order to meet those objectives and to satisfy 
increasing energy demand at a reasonable cost, low carbon electricity generation 
technologies, such as high efficient natural gas combined cycle power plants, nuclear 
power, renewable energies and carbon capture and storage technologies (CCS) on coal 
and natural gas plants will compete in the electricity mix (EC, 2012). Research on CCS is 
active, involving about 80 CCS projects worldwide with 19 in Europe, of which 15 are 
applied to the power sector (global CCS institute). The process involves separating CO2 
from power plants and transporting it to permanent storage in secure locations, such as 
deep saline aquifers and depleted oil and gas fields (for a CCS technical review see IPCC, 
2005). CCS can also be applied to biomass plants (BECCS) to provide a source of 
carbon negative electricity. Interest in BECCS has grown rapidly as it has the potential to 
offer the permanent net removal of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from the 
atmosphere thanks to sustainable biomass harvesting practices and the permanent 
geological storage of CO22. Empirical studies using bottom-up energy models show that 
BECCS has an important role to play in the future electricity mix (Azar et al., 2006, 2010; 
Katofsky et al., 2010; Luckow et al., 2010; Ricci and Selosse, 2012; van den Broek et al., 
2011; van Vuuren et al., 2007). Therefore, CCS technologies for coal, natural gas and 
biomass power plants could be attractive options to replace nuclear power and drastically 
reduce emissions in Europe.   
In this context of global climate change and reduced social and political acceptance of 
nuclear power expansion in some European countries, we use the French version of the 
TIMES Integrated Assessment Model (TIAM-FR) to evaluate the impact of reducing 
and even slowly phasing out nuclear power on the evolution of the electricity mix, while 
considering the availability of CCS and BECCS technological options. This paper 
attempts to provide some answers to the following question: Are CCS on fossil and 
biomass power plants good substitutes for nuclear energy to decarbonize the electricity 
sector? What is the cost of nuclear power reduction and nuclear phase-out in Europe 
under an emissions reduction policy?  
                                                            
2 Biomass absorbs CO2 from the atmosphere through the process of photosynthesis and releases 
it during combustion. If the released CO2 can be captured and stored permanently it then 
creates a situation of “negative CO2 emissions”. 
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Well before the Fukushima accident, several studies analyzed the effects of nuclear 
phase-out on electricity prices and carbon emissions. They observed a rise in electricity 
prices and costs associated with welfare losses, a decline in electricity exports and a rise 
in carbon emissions due to a shift from nuclear energy to fossil fuel power plants 
(Hoster 1998; Nakata, 2002). Nevertheless, the current environmental context of 
reducing emissions should also be taken into account when considering a possible 
nuclear phase-out as well as the possible deployment of carbon capture and storage 
technologies. Under a stringent climate scenario, models tend to favor the widespread 
deployment of nuclear energy. Therefore, boundaries on the expansion of nuclear power 
result in an increase in the system’s economic cost. When CCS is available, studies show 
that it should be widely implemented to decrease the cost of reaching low mitigation 
targets, as it appears to be a good substitute for nuclear energy (McJeon et al, 2011; Mori, 
2012; Tavoni and van der Zwaan, 2011). The analysis presented here is a contribution to 
this subject with a focus on Europe. It highlights CCS and BECCS power’s potential to 
help mitigate climate change while dealing with severe resistance to nuclear expansion.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 presents the current picture of nuclear 
power capacity and CCS projects in Europe. Section 2 describes the TIAM-FR model 
and the policy scenarios. Section 3 presents and discusses the results of the long-term 
modeling. The conclusion summarizes the main results and the limits of our analysis. 
1. A panorama of nuclear capacity and CCS projects in Europe  
1.1. Nuclear power capacity: current picture 
Europe has gone through three nuclear construction waves, in the 1960s, the 1970s, and 
the biggest in the1980s. In 2012, 15 countries in Europe operate 137 reactors with a total 
installed capacity of 125155 MW; this represents about one third of the world’s total 
capacity (table 1, IAEA-PRIS, 2012). Since the Fukushima accident, in Europe only 
Germany has directly shut down 8 of its power plants. Its installed capacity went from 
20490 MW in 2011 to 12068 MW in 2012. In 2011, the largest nuclear producer was 
France (423 TWh), followed by Germany (102 TWh)3, the United Kingdom (62 TWh), 
Sweden (58 TWh), Spain (55TWh) and Belgium (46 TWh). Nuclear energy accounted 
for 77.7 % of France’s total electricity generation and 39 % or more in Sweden, Belgium, 
Switzerland, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia (table 1). 
                                                            
3 These 2011 figures will change following the impact of Fukushima on Germany policies 
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Table 1: Nuclear capacity in Europe 
 
Countries 
Reactors 
operable 
(Nb) 
Total net electricity
capacity (MW) 
September 2012 
Nuclear Electricity 
supplied (TWh) 
2011 
Nuclear share 
(%) 2011 
France 58 63,130 423.5 77.7 
United Kingdom 16 9,246 62.6 17.8 
Sweden 10 9,378 58.1 39.6 
Germany 9 12,068 102.3 17.8 
Spain 8 7,560 55.1 19.5 
Belgium 7 5,927 45.9 54 
Czech Republic 6 3,766 26.7 33 
Switzerland 5 3,263 25.7 40.8 
Finland 4 2,736 22.3 31.6 
Hungary 4 1,889 14.7 43.2 
Slovakia 4 1,816 14.3 54 
Bulgaria 2 1,906 15.3 32.6 
Romania 2 1,300 10.8 19 
Netherlands 1 482 3.9 3.6 
Slovenia 1 688 5.9 41.7 
Source: IAEA-PRIS (2012) 
One important determinant of the future of nuclear energy in Europe is the age of the 
current operational nuclear reactors (van der Zwaan, 2008). Figure 1 shows the age 
distribution of European power plants by number of years in operation. The average age 
of European operating nuclear power plants is 28 years.  
Figure 1: Number of nuclear power plants in Europe by years in operation 
 
Source: IAEA-PRIS (2012) 
In Europe, the initial projected lifespan of nuclear power plants is usually 30 to 40 years. 
However, some nuclear utilities envisage a reactor lifetime extension of over 40 years 
and even up to 60 years. This scenario is less likely since Fukushima, as many questions 
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regarding safety upgrades, maintenance costs, and other issues need to be addressed 
more carefully (Worldwatch institute, 2011). Moreover, the French Nuclear Safety 
Authority (ASN) evaluated on a reactor-by-reactor basis whether a unit could operate for 
more than 30 years and concluded that the issue of lifetimes beyond 40 years was 
irrelevant. Therefore, if we assume nuclear phase-out in Europe (investment in new 
nuclear power plants is not allowed and the lifespan of the plant is fixed at 40 years), 
26% of nuclear power plants will be shut down by 2020, 88% by 2030 and 99% by 2050.  
1.2. CCS projects  
If CCS is to become an essential climate change mitigation option, it would need to grow 
from megatons to gigatons (Herzog, 2011). The challenge for the CCS industry is to 
demonstrate the entire chain at the commercial stage, from the capture of CO2 to its 
injection into suitable storage sites. In 2011, there were eight large-scale projects in 
operation around the world and six under construction. This represents a total CO2 
storage capacity of 33 megatons per year (global CCS institute). In Europe, only two 
CCS projects were actually operating among the 19 projects. The Sleipner gas-processing 
project in Norway started in 1996. About 1 Mt of CO2 is captured per year using pre-
combustion technology and stored in a deep saline aquifer in the North Sea. The second 
operating project is the Snøhvit project. This is the first petroleum production plant in 
the Barents Sea. Gas production started in 2007 and CO2 capture, using amine 
technology, started in 2008. About 700,000 tons of CO2 are injected into an offshore 
deep saline aquifer. The majority of these projects are related to power generation (15 
projects). Six projects are located in the UK, three in the Netherlands and one each in 
Spain, Italy, Norway, Bulgaria, Poland and Romania (for a list of the projects see global 
CCS institute). Half of the storage will be located offshore, either in deep saline aquifers 
or in depleted oil and gas reservoirs. There is currently one project injecting CO2 from a 
biotic source (an ethanol plant) located in Texas, Unites States. Several BECCS projects, 
mainly in the ethanol and pulp and paper sectors, are being evaluated or under 
construction worldwide (Biorecro, 2011). In the power sector, most coal and natural gas 
power facilities could substitute some or all of their fossil fuel feedstocks with biomass. 
We assume in the study that co-firing and full biomass plants are available technologies 
to mitigate climate change. CCS seems to be a promising technology to reduce CO2 
emissions in Europe, but to scale up this technology, key issues need to be addressed, 
such as decreasing its cost, large-scale transport infrastructure, legal and regulatory issues, 
and storage uncertainties (Herzog, 2011). 
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2. TIAM-FR description and policy scenarios 
2.1. TIAM-FR model 
TIAM-FR is the French version of the TIMES Integrated Assessment Model, a widely 
used, linear programming TIMES family model developed under the IEA’s Energy 
Technology Systems Analysis Program (ETSAP). TIAM-FR is a bottom-up optimization 
model. It depicts the world energy system with a detailed description of different primary 
energy forms, existing and future technologies characterized by their economic and 
technological parameters4, and end-use sectors that constitute the Reference Energy 
System (RES) (Figure 2). Each primary energy form is extracted from multiple layers of 
reserves (fossil, biomass) or from resource potential (wing, hydro, geothermal, etc.) each 
with a potential and a specific unit cost. This constitutes a supply curve for each energy 
form. Each energy demand is exogenously determined by the modeler5.  
Figure 2: Synthetic view of the reference energy system 
 
The development of the energy system can be analyzed in a short-, medium- and long-
term perspective up until the year 2100. Our analysis focuses on the period 2005-2050. 
TIAM-FR is geographically integrated into 15 global regions, but the study only takes 
Europe into consideration (Eastern Europe (EEU) 6  and Western Europe (EU-15, 
Iceland, Malta, Norway and Switzerland; (WEU)). TIAM-FR is a linear-programming 
                                                            
4 Investment cost, fixed and variable costs, availability factor, efficiency, lifetime, discount rate, 
etc. 
5 If desired, energy demand can be endogenously calculated via price elasticities. 
6 EEU includes Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Yugoslavia. 
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approach in which the technical optimum is computed by minimizing the discounted 
global cost of the energy system, on the time horizon. For each region, it computes a 
total net present value of the stream of annual costs, discounted to a selected reference 
year. These regional discounted costs are then aggregated into a single total cost which is 
the objective function to be minimized by the model while satisfying numbers on 
constraints.  
TIAM-FR integrates several carbon capture and sequestration technologies on fossil or 
bioenergy resources. The purpose of the capture process is to get a concentrated stream 
of almost pure CO2 at high pressure. Three modes of capturing CO2 from fossil fuels 
(coal, oil, natural gas) are retained: 1) a post-combustion mode using a variety of 
processes, such as reactive absorption or membranes, 2) a pre-combustion mode 
converting chemical energy fuel into H2, followed by simultaneous low-cost carbon 
separation and 3) an oxy-combustion mode characterized by limited costs of CO2 
separation but necessitating O2 supply. For bioplants and co-firing plants, two capture 
technologies are considered: pre-combustion capture for the biomass gasification 
process, and post-combustion capture for the biomass direct combustion process. For 
each technology, economic parameters are entered, such as capital costs incurred for 
investing and dismantling processes, operation and maintenance costs, efficiency, and 
the date the technology will enter the market. Regarding carbon transport, investment 
costs represent about 90% of the total cost of transport, and a cost of 10$/tCO2 is 
assumed in the model for Europe. 
CO2 can be stored in depleted oil and gas fields, deep saline aquifers and deep 
unmineable coal seams. Theoretical storage capacities are indicated by region with a 
distinction between onshore and offshore. Cumulated global storage capacities are 
13,900 Gt of CO2. Saline aquifers offer by far the largest storage capacity with 11,930 
billion tons of CO2. In Europe, we have identified with the greatest possible accuracy 
the state of data storage capacity in each country. Based on the most pessimistic 
assumptions of the Geocapacity report (2009), a cumulated total capacity of 150 Gt of 
CO2 was retained for Europe, where 128 GtCO2 are located in Western Europe and 22 
GtCO2 in Eastern Europe. 65% of the storage capacities are located offshore. The 
distribution of reservoirs is uneven across countries. The leading countries in terms of 
potential are the United Kingdom (50.4 Gt), Norway (29 Gt), Germany (17 Gt) and 
Spain (10 Gt) (figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Storage capacities in Europe 
Source: Geocapacity (2009), Energy technology Institute (ETI, 2012) for the United Kingdom and Energy/Geological 
survey of the Netherlands (EGSN, 2012) for the Netherlands 
Storage costs depend on the capacity of the reservoir and the number of injection wells. 
Based on the costs of the Zero Emissions Platform (the European Technology Platform 
for Zero Emission Fossil Fuel Power Plants, ZEP), the investment costs assumed are 
the following: 3$/tCO2 for onshore depleted oil and gas fields and 7$/tCO2 for 
offshore, 5$/tCO2 for onshore aquifers and 15$/tCO2 for offshore and 5$/tCO2 for 
coal seams.  
2.2. Scenario definitions 
Different scenarios are built to analyze the impact on the evolution of the electricity mix 
of European emission reduction targets, nuclear policy recommendations formulated in 
the latest EU roadmap 2050, and possible nuclear phase-out.  
- BAU scenario: A baseline business-as-usual scenario without any emission 
constraint is calculated first. In this reference scenario, no climate and energy 
policies are assumed. This scenario outlines some key patterns in the evolution of 
the European energy system, as represented in TIAM-FR.  
- EU_preFuku: This scenario discusses the changes induced by a combination of a 
stringent environmental and nuclear policy, as announced in its roadmap. In this 
scenario, European CO2 emissions must decrease by 20% by 2020 and 80% by 
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2050 compared to 1990 levels 7 , and nuclear energy is exogenously fixed to 
represent 26.5% of electricity generation in 2050. Moreover, global CO2 
emissions are reduced by 50% in 2050 compared with 2005 levels in order to be 
consistent with the 2°C objective.  
- EU_postFuku: The environmental constraint is the same as in the previous 
scenario (EU_preFuku). In line with the post-Fukushima scenario developed in 
the European Roadmap 2050, nuclear energy is exogenously fixed to represent 
20.5% of electricity generation in 2030 and 2050, instead of 26.5% in the pre-
Fukushima scenario. 
To discuss alternative development paths of the electricity system, we investigate two 
other scenarios with constraints on technology availability (EU_NoNuclear and 
EU_NoCCS):  
- EU_NoNuclear: The environmental objective is the same as in EU_postFuku 
and EU_preFuku. However, a nuclear electricity slowdown in Europe is studied. 
According to the panorama on nuclear power in Europe (presented in section 1), 
we assume that investments in new nuclear power plants are not allowed during 
the time period. The lifespan of nuclear power plants is 40 years, so existing 
nuclear power plants close at the end of their lifetime. 
- EU_NoCCS: Due to the substantial uncertainties regarding the future 
deployment of CCS mentioned in section 1, we also consider a case where 
carbon capture and storage is not available throughout the time horizon. Climate 
constraints, however, are those expressed in the pre- and post-Fukushima 
scenarios.  
 
3. Results  
3.1. European emissions 
Global CO2 emissions rise from 26 Gt in 2005 to 52 Gt in 2050 in the BAU scenario, 
i.e. a growth rate of 98%, while European CO2 emissions increase from 4.4 Gt to 5.8 Gt 
over the same period, i.e. a growth rate of 32% (Figure 4). European CO2 emissions 
represent 17% of global CO2 emissions in 2005 and 11% in 2050. This result is 
                                                            
7 This carbon constraint represents the lowest CO2 mitigation target by 2020 put forward by Europe to 
UNFCCC for the Copenhagen Agreement in January 2010, and by 2050 as expressed in its Roadmap 
2050. 
Les Cahiers de la Chaire – Octobre 2012 
11 
 
explained by the growing share of China (from 18% of global CO2 emissions in 2005 to 
31% in 2050) and India (from 4% to 7%) in the release of carbon emissions. The USA 
follows the same pathways as Europe, with their CO2 emissions representing 14% of 
global emissions in 2050 compared to 22% in 2005. 
 
Figure 4: CO2 emissions (Gt) 
 
In the climate constraint scenarios (EU_preFuku as in EU_postFuku), where world CO2 
emissions are reduced by 50% in 2050 (by comparison with 2005) and EU emissions 
decrease by 20% in 2020 and 80% in 2050 (by comparison with 1990), EU emissions 
represent 7% of the world’s CO2 emissions, i.e. 0.9 Gt of CO2 in 2050. China, the 
Middle East and the USA represent 30%, 18% and 14% respectively of global emissions 
in 2050.  
3.2. European power generation 
In the BAU scenario, 70% of electricity is produced by fossil power plants (66% from 
coal and 4% from oil and gas). The climate constraint induces a significant change in the 
structure of the electricity mix in 2050 to move to a low-carbon society (figure 5). The 
direct effect is a strong reduction of the production of electricity by coal and gas power 
plants without CCS. Indeed, this stringent environmental target induces a new 
fuel/technology choice in favor of CCS deployment. By 2050, 38% of European 
electricity is produced by fossil and bio power plants with a capture technology in 
EU_preFuku and 43% in EU_postFuku, as the nuclear share is constrained to be 
reduced in the new nuclear policy.  The low carbon constraint also induces a significant 
development of renewable energy. This represents 26% of the European power mix in 
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2050 in EU_preFuku and EU_postFuku scenarios compared to 1% in the BAU 
scenario. 
Figure 5: European power generation (TWh) in 2050 
 
It is interesting to note that the post-Fukushima nuclear policy, which shows a lower 
share of nuclear electricity in Europe in the future (EU_postFuku scenario), involves an 
increase in the number of carbon capture technologies on power plants. So, CCS 
technologies appear to be a potential substitute for nuclear power when a stringent 
carbon constraint is applied, and more so than renewable energies. 
Figure 6: European power generation (TWh) in 2050 in contrasted scenarios 
 
This technological choice is all the more favored in a scenario where nuclear power 
generation is no longer deployed in the time horizon: the EU_NoNuclear scenario. 
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Indeed, the share of European electricity produced by plants with CCS reaches 57% in 
2050 in EU-NoNuclear (Figure 6). Renewable electricity represents 27% of European 
power generation in 2050 in EU_NoNuclear. The share of hydroelectricity remains fairly 
constant, representing 14% instead of 13% in the EU_postFuku scenario.  
A focus on power plants with carbon capture shows that despite the potential of 
negative emissions induced by BECCS, fossil plants remain dominant in Europe (Figure 
7). 
Figure 7: European power generation (TWh) by plant with carbon capture in 
2050 
 
Gas represents 26% and 34% of power plants with CCS in 2050 in EU_preFuku and 
EU_postFuku respectively, and reaches 46% in EU_NoNuclear. Coal is also largely 
solicited but associated with biomass energies in co-firing IGCC plants with CCS. These 
represent 47% and 41% respectively in pre- and post-Fukushima scenarios and 35% in 
the scenario expressing a progressive phase-out of nuclear in Europe. In these co-firing 
power plants, biomass represents a maximum of 20% of the energy input to generate 
electricity.  
Moreover, it is interesting to note that the less nuclear energy deployed, the more gas 
solicited to generate electricity. This situation is accentuated in the case of shutdown of 
nuclear power production in 2050 in EU_NoNuclear, where electricity from gas plants 
with CCS represents 46% of the plants with CCS. They represent 26% of the European 
power mix against 14% in the EU_postFuku scenario and 10% in the EU_preFuku 
scenario. Coal and biomass plants with CCS produce 35% of the electricity generated by 
plants with CCS in the EU_NoNuclear scenario, thus less than in the pre-and post- 
Fukushima scenarios. The share of bioplants with CCS significantly decreases in the mix 
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with CCS as the nuclear policy decreases the nuclear contribution to power generation in 
Europe. This is the case even when the level of bioelectricity generation with a bio plant 
equipped with CCS technologies remains fairly unchanged in 2050, whatever the 
scenario, i.e. around 530 TWh in 2050. In EU_NoNuclear, the use of BECCS is limited 
by the potential of biomass in Western Europe, i.e. 13 EJ in 2050. In Eastern Europe, 
the potential is not saturated; technological choice comes from cost characteristics of the 
energy system and from the distribution of carbon constraints in Europe between 
Eastern and Western Europe. In the other scenarios, the use of BECCS remains 
constant, however its potential is not fully used. This implies that, at a certain point, the 
marginal cost of BECCS becomes uncompetitive compared to other abatement options, 
so that BECCS is used almost constantly, regardless of the technological constraint put 
on nuclear power. 
To sum up, low carbon electricity generation options such as highly efficient natural gas 
combined cycle power plants, carbon capture technologies, nuclear power, and 
renewable energies, will compete in the electricity mix to meet climate targets. CCS 
technologies represent a significant option, and increasingly so in the case of nuclear 
phase-out. Indeed, gas and coal/biomass power plants with carbon capture are favored 
as renewable energies to replace the nuclear production of electricity. This raises the 
question of what will happen if carbon capture technologies are not developed in 
Europe in the future.  
Figure 8: European power generation (TWh) in 2050 by scenario 
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In the EU_NoCCS scenario, the low-carbon transition of the European energy system 
must be achieved without using CCS technologies. In 2050, to reach climate targets and 
respect the post-Fukushima nuclear policy expressed in the European roadmap to 2050, 
electricity is mainly produced by renewable energies. Indeed, 66% of the electricity 
generation comes from renewable energies; 81% if hydroelectricity (11%) and 
bioelectricity from biomass power plants (2%) are taken into account (Figure 8). Note 
that if nuclear constraint is released, renewables account for 63% of electricity generation 
and nuclear power reaches 23% (against 13% in the BAU scenario). 
Renewable energies in the electricity mix are mainly represented by solar power. Indeed, 
49% of European renewable electricity comes from solar energies in 2050 in 
EU_NoCCS. Geothermal and tidal electricity production represents 41% of renewable 
power generation (Figure 9). 
Wind electricity production remains almost unchanged whatever the scenario 
investigated. In this sense, solar, geothermal and tidal technologies tend to represent 
technological substitutes of CCS in a context of climate and nuclear constraints.  
Figure 9: European power generation (TWh) from renewables in 2050 
 
3.3. European carbon marginal costs perspective 
Figure 10 represents the marginal cost of carbon in each climate scenario. This 
corresponds to the cost induced by additional CO2 emissions in the case of an energy 
system constrained by a CO2 mitigation target. Depending on the energy system and in 
particular its technological constraints, this marginal cost could be higher or lower for a 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
Wind Geo and Tide Solar
EU_preFuku EU_postFuku EU_NoNuclear EU_NoCCS
Les Cahiers de la Chaire – Octobre 2012 
16 
 
similar carbon constraint. This is the case in the present study, where technological 
availability implemented in scenarios EU_NoNuclear and EU_NoCCS makes it harder 
to attain a low-carbon system. 
Figure 10: European carbon marginal costs (€/tCO2) 
 
In 2020, carbon marginal costs range from 52 €/tCO2 in EU_preFuku to 60 €/tCO2 in 
the EU_NoCCS scenario, via 56 €/tCO2 in EU_postFuku and EU_NoNuclear. Carbon 
marginal costs increase similarly over the time period in the pre- and post-Fukushima 
scenarios and in the non-Nuclear scenario, reaching 237, 238 and 246 €/tCO2 
respectively in 2050. By contrast, they reach 558 €/tCO2 in 2050 in the case where CCS 
technologies are not available in Europe, i.e. in the EU_NoCCS scenario. Cost 
differences occur from 2030, when investments have started to satisfy the stringent 
technological and climate constraints. In order to compensate CCS unavailability (and so 
the fossil production of electricity), the development of renewables outweighs the cost 
of the energy system in a low-carbon objective context. 
4. Conclusion 
To achieve environmental commitments, Europe must decide on a significant policy of 
energy substitution, since its electricity is currently mainly produced from fossil sources. 
This transition from a fossil fuel-based electricity sector to a decarbonized one is also 
impacted by the current debate on the role of nuclear power in society. In this context, 
nuclear policy assumptions in the EC energy roadmap have somewhat changed since the 
Fukushima incident, with a post-Fukushima nuclear scenario fixing a constant share at 
20.5% in 2030 and 2050, instead of 26.4% in 2050 before the accident. This paper 
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discusses a long-term technological and fuel shift in the European power system by 
implementing radical scenarios that express the unavailability of CCS and nuclear 
technologies in a carbon constraint context.  
First of all, the results suggest that CCS technologies constitute a key carbon reduction 
option in case of stringent climate targets. In particular, carbon reduction constraints do 
not allow the use of additional high-carbon-emitting fossil power plants without 
integrating carbon capture technologies. Furthermore, the limitation of nuclear electricity 
increases the use of CCS technologies. In 2050, the European electricity produced by 
plants with CCS ranges from 38% of total production in the pre-Fukushima scenario to 
43% in the post-Fukushima scenario. This rises to 57% in case of convergence towards 
nuclear phase-out. However, this could constitute a plausible pathway if power plants 
equipped with CCS were technologically and economically viable over the coming 
decades. In our model, the drivers of choice are the technological costs and the potential 
to respect imposed carbon constraints. The question is to determine whether, in Europe, 
the CO2 price will be sufficiently high to incentivize the construction of such plants 
considering that the cost of CCS remains uncertain (Herzog, 2011).  
By 2050, when CCS technologies are available, fossil fuels still dominate power 
generation through carbon capture technologies, but bio plants with CCS are also 
deployed, allowing negative emissions. Their level of electricity production fluctuates 
relatively little, reaching 530 TWh, with respect to the potential of biomass in Europe, 
limited to 13 EJ by 2050, and considering the cost competitiveness of processes. 
Biomass is also used in co-firing technologies in association with coal. These plants are 
largely deployed when equipped with CCS and represent more than 40% of the plants 
with CCS in the pre- and post-Fukushima scenarios. Their share decreases with the 
reduction of nuclear in favor of gas plants with CCS, even though their level of 
electricity production remains in the same order of magnitude. Power plants with CCS 
are preferred over with renewable energies to substitute nuclear production of electricity, 
even though renewables play an important role in the transition to a low-carbon 
electricity sector. Renewable sources represent 26% of the production of electricity in 
pre- and post-Fukushima scenarios, and 27% when nuclear tends to be phased out. In 
the EU_NoCCS scenario, the unavailability of CCS technologies involves a significant 
fuel shift from fossil to renewable energy sources. Renewable energies represent 66% of 
electricity production. However, concerning the future electricity mix, the debate often 
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centers on whether renewable energies have the potential to close the supply gap that 
would arise and result in a stable electricity system, particularly without nuclear power 
(Netzer and Steinhilber, 2011). In this case, fossil power plants offer the benefit of a 
secure and reliable system, and thereby CCS technologies in a carbon reduction 
objective. That said, renewable energy sources play a relatively important role in 
generating electricity in all scenarios, even though their place in the power system results 
from the respective roles of nuclear and CCS technologies. In the EU_NoCCS scenario, 
the share of renewable energy sources in electricity generation increases considerably, 
especially solar energy; this means ensuring that the power system is sufficiently flexible 
to be able to decarbonize it in a plausible long-term pathway, notably with 
complementary power plants. Increasingly sophisticated grids will be required in terms 
of electricity lines, smart grids and electrical storage (Förster et al., 2012; EC, 2011), 
along with the introduction of new market mechanisms. In the absence of electrical 
storage, the use of intermittent renewable electricity will be linked to an additional – and 
at least as significant – use of electricity based on gas or coal. At the same time, one of 
the benefits of large-scale renewable integration is that it could pursue not only the aims 
of the environmental commitment, but also the ones of the energy policy in a large 
sense, as the energy independence security and the strengthening of the national markets 
competitiveness.  
One limitation of this analysis is the fact that efficiency improvement should be taken 
into account since the future growth of electricity demand will have to be limited in 
order to achieve stringent carbon mitigation targets in the power sector. This constitutes 
a key point of the European Energy-Climate policy that has not been integrated into the 
model so far, with the exception of improving the efficiency of power plants over the 
time horizon. In their broad literature review and decarbonization scenario analyses, 
Forster et al. (2012) also highlight that the respective roles of nuclear and CCS 
technologies constitute the main bone of contention in the European power sector. 
There is a great deal of uncertainty regarding the costs and social acceptability of these 
technologies. CO2 geological storage increasingly comes up against social acceptability 
issues. Germany, for instance, no longer has a current CCS project following the 
cancellation of Jangswalde. CCS has been the focus of public protests based on the 
safety of insufficient storage and the “not in my backyard” phenomenon. This lack of 
social acceptability for onshore storage makes the prospect of offshore geological 
storage more probable. Therefore, it would be interesting to consider sensitivity analyses 
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with a scenario that prohibits onshore storage of carbon in order to evaluate whether 
Europe’s CCS potential is limited. 
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